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The institutional framework for the funding of higher education in the UK is discussed. In 
England, much of the financial support for teaching and learning, especially of ‘home and 
EU’ undergraduates, is channelled through the Higher Education Funding Council for 
England (HEFCE). HEFCE operates a formula funding mechanism, though in the wake of 
recent policy reforms – which include the introduction of differential tuition fees – this is 
likely to change. Some simple economic models of funding mechanisms which may be 
suitable for application in this context are constructed and evaluated. Implications for the 
design of future policies are discussed.  
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 1. Introduction 
 
The funding of higher education in the United Kingdom has undergone dramatic change over 
the last few years.
1 From the perspective of students, the main changes have concerned 
domestic undergraduates. Some 15 years ago, mortgage-type student loans were introduced to 
provide partial support for maintenance (living expenses). Until then, all student maintenance 
was paid in the form of a grant, supplemented on the basis of a parental means test by a 
contribution from the student’s parents. These grants were phased out over a number of years 
as the value of loans increased during the 1990s. Following the Dearing Report (National 
Committee of Inquiry into Higher Education, 1997), the mortgage loans were replaced by 
income-contingent loans in 1998-99, and the maintenance grant was scrapped. At the same 
time, a requirement was introduced that students should pay a fixed annual amount (initially 
£1000, but this rose steadily to £1175 in 2005-06) toward their tuition. Finally, the 2004 
Education Act introduced, from academic year 2006-07, the flexibility for institutions to 
determine their own levels of tuition fee up to a maximum of £3000 per year. So from 
October 2006, tuition fees will vary both across and within institutions. This policy has been 
accompanied by revisions to the student loans package, and by a reintroduction, albeit at a 
very low level, of a means tested maintenance grant.  
 
Undergraduate students’ contributions to the costs of tuition will remain, however, only a 
fraction of the income generated by higher education institutions. In addition to this, 
institutions receive income from overseas students (who have, at institutions’ discretion, paid 
premium fees since 1983) and all postgraduates (for whom the level of the tuition fee is 
likewise determined on a course by course basis by each institution). They receive income 
from the provision of research and outreach mission to public and private sector 
organisations. They also receive project-specific income from an array of seven area-specific 
research councils, funded by government. Finally, the Higher Education Funding Councils 
provide block grants to institutions to cover a portion of their teaching and research costs.  
 
The Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE)
2 provides funding for research 
on the basis of the numbers of research-active staff and of performance in the most recent 
Research Assessment Exercise. This amounts to about £1¼ billion per year. In addition, 
HEFCE provides over £4 billion per year in recurrent funding (and over £½ billion in capital 
funding) to support teaching and learning in higher education institutions. This amounts to 
about £2700 for each ‘home and EU’ student (undergraduate and postgraduate).  
 
HEFCE’s system of support for the teaching function of higher education institutions has 
been subject to periodic changes, but in essence the system is one in which institutions are 
rewarded on the basis of the numbers of student recruited. The first stage in the methodology 
inolves an estimation of the resource needed to deliver learning to each institution’s students. 
This calculation is based on actual student numbers, with different weightings attached to 
                                                 
1 It should be stressed that, since devolution of political powers to Wales and Scotland in 1998, differences have 
emerged in the funding models adopted in the different constituent countries of Great Britain. The description 
that follows applies to England. Note that Scotland, in particular, has followed its own course, most notably in 
that it does not allow its institutions to charge tuition fees for domestic undergraduates (although it does require 
graduates to make a financial contribution). 
2 There exist also the Higher Education Funding Council for Wales and the Scottish Higher Education Funding 
Council. In Northern Ireland, funding comes from the Department of Education for Northern Ireland, advised by 
the Northern Ireland Higher Education Council and, though a service-level agreement, by HEFCE. In this paper, 
our attention will be focused on the English system. 
  2different subjects.
3 The estimated resource need (known as the ‘standard resource’) is then 
compared with a second figure known as the ‘assumed resource’. This is essentially the 
inflation-adjusted grant that the institution received in the previous year, with allowance made 
for changes in fee income and other factors. So long as the standard resource is within 5 per 
cent of the assumed resource, the HEFCE teaching grant made to the institution in the current 
year equals the assumed resource. If the gap exceeds 5 per cent, HEFCE will take some 
action; this typically involves an adjustment in student numbers.  
 
The ± 5 per cent tolerance band implies that institutions may vary the numbers of students 
that they recruit from year to year. This offers institutions, which are formally autonomous 
and legally independent of government, a great measure of flexibility. Premia are available to 
support the widening participation agenda, part-time modes of study, and location in London 
(where institutions face higher salary and property costs). HEFCE’s methodology is therefore 
a formula funding method, and offers very limited scope for variation in how the formula is 
applied across institutions. 
 
While this approach offers a great deal of transparency, it is a methodology that is intolerant 
of diversity. An institution which wished to incur high costs as a means of delivering 
exceptionally high quality product would find its funding squeezed as it approached the 
bound of the tolerance band. In the current funding model, adjustments can be made for 
individual institutions in some circumstances – the London weighting for example, or ad hoc 
arrangements for agreed additional student numbers. But these adjustments are best seen as 
operating outwith the funding model per se. This lack of flexibility, which in many respects is 
the key strength of any formula funding mechanism, is increasingly being viewed as a 
deficiency of the current model.
4  
 
This being so, and in light of the changes going on in other aspects of higher education 
funding, HEFCE is currently conducting a review of its funding mechanism for teaching and 
learning. A key objective of the new model is that it should more explicitly support diversity 
and variation in the provision of learning in higher education. In this respect at least, we can 
expect the new funding model to have similarities with the full Economic Costing (fEC) 
approach introduced in 2005 by the British research councils. This links in also to the 
adoption of a TRansparent Approach to Costing (TRAC), initially implemented for research 
costs, but currently spreading to other areas of activity within higher education institutions.  
The adoption of fEC in the context of research grants is widely seen to have increased income 
to universities. The fact that, early in 2005, HEFCE commissioned a project to explore the 
viability of using a cost-based approach to inform a revised teaching funding methodology 
suggests that the funding council is contemplating a move in the direction of fEC also for 
teaching.
5  It is not clear whether or not HEFCE expects institutions to gain from this, but the 
results obtained by Johnes et al. (2005) suggest that revenues for teaching currently 
approximately equal costs. 
 
Nonetheless, the perception that there exists a discrepancy between ‘expenditures’ and ‘costs’ 
in higher education is a powerful one. This distinction is not obvious to economists who tend 
                                                 
3 Subject Bands A, B and C attract 4, 1.7 and 1.3 times respectively the funding attached to Band D. Band A 
refers to medicine and allied subjects; Band B comprises laboratory based subjects; Band C is made up of 
subjects that are part classroom based and part laboratory based; and Band D subjects are classroom based.  
4 HEFCE is committed to reducing the number of ‘special initiatives’ that require insitutions to invest time in 
preparing bids for ring-fenced project funding. 
5 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200405/cmselect/cmsctech/220/220we119.htm 
  3to use the terms interchangably. But HEFCE’s interpretation of the terms is consistent with a 
view that expenditures can exceed costs owing to inefficiencies in production.
6 This means 
that any move toward a cost based methodology for teaching funding will likely aim to 
squeeze any inefficiency out of the system. Such a move is also, however, likely to mean that 
a greater measure of differentiation across insitutions in the remuneration offered by the 
funding council would be likely, this differentiation being driven by justified differences in 
institutions’ costs. In this respect, cost based funding may be contrasted with formula funding; 
while, in (at least an extreme variant of) the latter case, the same formula applies to all 
institutions, in the former case the parameters of the formula are allowed to vary across 
institutions.
7 In the formal models developed later in this paper, we therefore examine both 
cases in which the move toward cost based funding implies a squeeze on inefficiency and 
cases where the nature of the funding mechanism departs from a uniform formula.  
 
The summary given above of the funding of higher education institutions in England is 
necessarily a simple one. It should be clear, however, that HEFCE performs a role as a buffer 
organisation between government and the educational institutions. It is a quasi-non-
governmental organisation (quango) with a mission to work in partnership (with institutions) 
to ‘promote and fund high-quality, cost-effective teaching and research, meeting the diverse 
needs of students, the economy and society’. In a context where the development of a higher 
education system is planned by government, the role of a quango of this type is to free the 
allocation of resources from the political process. Moreover, given appropriate design of 
incentive mechanisms, it can do much to enhance efficiency of delivery. This type of mindset 
is reflected in the council’s most recent strategy,
8 which states that the context within which 
the council operates ‘implies a system that is efficiently run – one that makes good use of 
scarece resources. It should be a flexible, responsive and sustainable system where new needs 
are actively identified and met.’ Implicit in this approach is the existence of twin principles – 
‘sustainability’ (to ensure that institutions remain solvent while at least maintaining the 
quality of their provision) and ensuring that public funds do not subsidise private activity. 
This insight informs the modelling of the council’s behaviour in the sequel. 
 
Whether such a view of the role of the funding council is apposite in the context of the current 
system of higher education in England is moot, however. The introduction of differential 
tuition fees may be regarded as a simple exercise in cost sharing. In this case, HEFCE’s 
principles as outlines above remain valid. On the other hand, a more radical interpretation of 
the government’s approach to higher education policy would be to view differential tuition 
fees as a move toward a more market oriented system – one in which the disciplines of the 
market should apply with full force. If we take this view, the impact of HEFCE is to blunt the 
incentives provided by the market. By protecting institutions from financial catastrophe, the 
funding council could, in effect, be isolating them from the disciplines that are now supposed 
to be provided by the market. If the intention of the government in allowing differential 
tuition fees is indeed to sharpen market forces, then HEFCE as it currently operates is at odds 
with the thrust of the government’s policy. The nature of this tension will be explored later 
when we introduce an analytical model of decision making under a tuition fee regime. It is a 
tension that remains unresolved as differential fees are about to be introduced. 
                                                 
6 http://www.hefce.ac.uk/pubs/hefce/2005/05_21/05_21.pdf, especially paragraphs 64-67. 
7 In practice, funding mechanisms tend to combine elements of these two extremes. Hence, the current system 
includes a London weighting. It is useful therefore to think of many funding mechanisms that we observe in the 
world as being located along a continuum with full formula funding at one extreme and full cost based funding at 
the other. 
8 http://www.hefce.ac.uk/pubs/hefce/2005/05_16/05_16.pdf 
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In the remainder of this paper, we investigate the implications of a shift in funding council 
policy in the direction of a teaching funding model that can ‘support diversity and variation’. 
While the analysis is cast in a very specialised context – that of higher education in England – 
it should be clear that much of what follows is, potentially at least, of much wider 
applicability. Indeed, while the objectives of HEFCE might be regarded as idiosyncratic, the 
design of reward mechanisms is an area of interest throughout the public sector and beyond. 
The next section provides a series of simple models that can be used to analyse the funding 




2. Modelling the funding mechanism 
 
2.1 Basic Model 
 
To begin the formal modelling, we develop a simple model of formula funding in which the 
funding council allocates resources across two institutions. The institutions compete are in 
Nash (1951) competition with each other, and each faces a given cost technology. The 
objective of the funding council is to design a formula that will provide each institution with 
sufficient resource to break even (‘sustainability’), but which will not allow either institution 
to make surpluses (which would enable public funding to subsidise private activity). The 
formula in this simple model is constrained such that average revenue is constant with respect 
to output. Moreover, the same formula funding mechanism applies to each institution. 
 
Since we shall wish to use this model to investigate a transition from an expenditure based 
formula (where some expenditures may be inefficient) to a cost based formula, we include in 
the determination of expenditures an inefficiency parameter. 
 
Consider then a game in which there are two institutions, each of which chooses its level of 
output so as to maximise surplus. Expenditures of the ith institution are given by 
 
Ci = c + c0qi + c1qi
2 + ε        
 
where qi denotes the output of the ith institution and ε is the inefficiency parameter which we 
assume to be constant across institutions. The c, c0 and c1 are parameters so that c denotes the 
level of fixed costs that would attach to a perfectly efficient institution. Suppose further that 
the revenue per unit of output is determined by formula, such that revenue per unit, p, exactly 




2)+2(c+ε)}/(q1+q2)        
 




2)+2(c+ε)}qi/(q1+q2) - c0qi - c1qi
2 – (c+ε) 
 qi 
 




2 = 2(c+ε)/c1  ∀i, j≠i 
  5 
and hence 
 
qi =  √[(c+ε)/c1]   ∀i 
 
Since p is set so that surplus is zero, the optimum can be thought of a point of tangency 
between a convex total cost curve and a linear total revenue line, the latter of which passes 
through the origin (see Figure 1)
9.  
 
Note that lowering ε (as would likely happen in a move from expenditure-based to cost-based 
funding, for example) would shift the total cost curve down and would make the total revenue 
curve (which always passes through the origin) flatter, thereby reducing the level of output at 
which the total revenue curve is tangential to the total cost curve (Figure 2). This means that 
any move from expenditure-based funding to cost-based funding would be unlikely to 
facilitate achievement of the government’s ambitious target for participation in higher 
education. 
 
Some assumptions underpin the above model that might appear incongruous at first sight. 
First, it is assumed that institutions have the freedom to choose the level of student 
recruitment that they wish. The width of the ± 5 per cent tolerance band certainly gives 
institutions a considerable degree of discretion. But the implicit assumption here is that 
institutions are not constrained by demand.
10 Again, the current situation in England supports 
this assumption. In 2005, many prospective students failed to secure a place in any higher 
education institution (despite achieving the minimum requirement of two passes in the 
national Advanced Level examinations) owing to supply constraints.
11 Further, it is assumed 
that the funding council has sufficient funds to support whatever level of output the 
institutions choose. In reality the ± 5 per cent tolerance band protects the council from sudden 
changes in the claims that institutions make on its funds, but again the band is a broad one 
that is rarely breached in practice. Taken together, these assumptions imply that it is the 
technology underpinning the cost curve, and the reward structure represented by the formula 
funding mechanism, that determine institutions’ choices about how many student places to 
offer. 
 
Refinements of this model are clearly possible which would add realism. We proceed to 
consider, in turn: quality issues; the introduction of tuition fees; heterogeneity of costs across 
institution under both formula funding and differential funding; a fully flexible funding 
model; output target setting; and multiproduct institutions. 
 
 
2.2 Quality issues 
 
In the above model, institutions may vary qi with impunity. There are at least two reasons why 
this may be unrealistic. First, the funding council may impose restrictions on the extent to 
which qi may be varied from one period to the next, in the interests of stability; this is, in the 
HEFCE context, the case of a breach of the ± 5 per cent tolerance band. Secondly, even in the 
                                                 
9 The i subscript is supressed in the diagrams. 
10 Typically institutions adjust the effective demand for their course by using grades obtained by students at the 
national Advanced Level examinations as a pricing mechanism. 
11 Times 30 August 2005. 
  6absence of this type of restriction, contractual arrangements with staff may mean that it is not 
possible to effect a substantial reduction in supply at short notice, and hiring arrangements 
may likewise limit the extent to which a substantial uplift in provision is possible. 
 
This being so, it is appropriate to consider how institutions might react if a change in the 
funding mechanism – a reduction in p similar to that considered earlier – were to be 
introduced under conditions where they are unable to change output in response. Starting 
from a point of tangency between the total cost curve and total revenue curve, suppose the 
total cost curve shifts down and the total revenue line pivots clockwise (as in Figure 2). The 
new tangency point would be to the left of the original solution, indicating that output should 
be reduced. If, however, output cannot be reduced, institutions would make losses unless they 
are able to reduce their costs.  
 
But now suppose that a cost reduction might be achieved by reducing c0 (which in all other 
parts of the paper we assume to be given), holding all other parameters constant. In this case, 
the total cost curve ‘rolls up and along’ the total revenue line until a new tangency point is 
reached at the original level of output (Figure 3).  
 
This reduction in costs could be achieved by, for example, increasing student:staff ratios or 
reducing student support. This would compromise quality. So a key question to ask in 
considering quality issues is: how firm is the funding council’s resolution to limit the extent to 
which institutions can vary their output from one period to the next? 
 
The above ideas may be formalised by noting that, for given qi, the level to which c0 must fall 
in the ith institution in order to maintain a solution in which the gradients of the total cost and 







Note that the first derivative of this expression with respect to ε is unambiguously positive, 
indicating that quality must decline as ε falls if qi is not allowed to vary. 
 
Within the UK, quality is very much an issue of policy interest. Each higher education 
institution has procedures in place to assure and enhance the quality of its provision in the 
teaching and learning domain, and these are externally monitored by the Quality Assurance 
Agency (QAA).
12 Other mechanisms to assure quality include the external examiner system 
and a panoply of rankings, both based on officially collected data and on newspaper reports. 
In practice these mechanisms may well limit the leeway that certain institutions might have to 
accommodate reductions in funding by reducing quality. If it wishes to move to a ‘cost based’ 
funding system while maintaining or increasing graduate numbers, therefore, the funding 
council will need to be sure that institutions can (and will) bear any cuts in the unit of 
resource through efficiency gains, not by cutting quality.  
 
From 2006, differential tuition fees will provide a further, and important, incentive to 
institutions to provide a service whose quality is demonstrably high. Differential tuition fees 
form the focus of discussion in our next refinement of the model.  
                                                 
12 The QAA, founded in 1997, is an independent body funded by contracts with the funding councils and by 
subscriptions from higher education institutions.  
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2.3 Tuition fees 
 
The above models assume that funding from the funding council represents the only source of 
income for institutions. In fact, as we have seen, there exist a plethora of other funding 
sources, though only a few are directly related to teaching and learning. In view of the focus 
of this paper on the teaching of ‘home and EU’ undergraduates, the introduction of 
differential tuition fees in 2006 is especially pertinent, and it is therefore appropriate that we 
should investigate the implications for our model of this policy innovation.  
 
The models discussed above are founded on the assumption that the funding council chooses 
its funding mechanism to satisfy a zero-surplus constraint for each institution, assuming that 
each institution then chooses output to maximise surplus. If this constraint remains in place 
while tuition fees are introduced, no model can be tractable, since there would be no reason 
for institutions to prefer one level of tuition fee to another – the funding council would ensure 
that zero surplus is made whatever level of fee is introduced, and so institutions would be 
indifferent about the level of tuition fee charged.
13 The zero-surplus constraint therefore needs 
to be modified if the existence of differential tuition fees is to be accommodated in the model. 
This is done in the sequel by assuming that the funding council sets its zero-surplus constraint 
assuming that each institution then chooses both the tuition fee and the output level that 
maximises its surplus.  
 
Suppose that each institution faces an inverse demand function given by  
 
ti = Q + θtj - ρqi  ∀i, j≠i 
 
where ti is the tuition fee paid per student at institution i. Substituting for tj yields 
 
ti = Q* - αqi - βqj   ∀i, j≠i 
 
where Q*, α and β are appropriately defined.  
 




2)+2(c+ε)}/(q1+q2) – Q* + αqi + βqj 
 













2 = 0 
 
                                                 
13 In exactly the same way, if the funding council guaranteed a zero-surplus solution in the basic model 
regardless of the choice of output made by institutions, no solution of the model would be possible. 
  8Analytical solution of this model is simplified by assuming c1=0. Hence, solving the pair of 





Depending on which root represents the solution, the impact of ε on qi may now be positive or 
negative. The introduction of tuition fees into the model therefore considerably complicates 
the analysis and removes our ability to make unambiguous statements of the impact of 
changes in key parameters.
14 In the remainder of the paper we therefore abstract from tuition 
fees in order to focus solely on the effects of funding council support. 
 
 
2.4 Heterogeneity of costs and formula funding 
 
In this section we consider the case in which costs differ across institutions and subjects. We 
assume that the funding council sets p so that the institution with the higher costs makes a 
zero surplus. In this case there is no strategic interdependence between the institutions, and 
solution of the model is very straightforward.  
 
Suppose costs are given by 
 
Ci = ic + c0qi + c1qi
2 + ε 
 
where  ic denotes fixed costs of the ith institution and where 2c < 1c. The funding council 
determines p so that marginal revenue of institution 2 equals marginal cost, where the total 
revenue line is constrained to pass through the origin so that the solution occurs at a zero-
surplus point. This is where ∂Ci/∂qi = Ci/qi, that is where  
  
2c + c0q2 + c1q2




which implies that  
 
q2 =   √[(2c+ε)/c1] 
 
and that the remuneration per unit of output, p = c0+2(2c+ε)/√[(2c+ε)/c1]. 
 
Since the total cost curves of the two institutions are vertically parallel, q1=q2. In this case, 
institution 1 will make a surplus of (2c-1c)q1, and this represents a deadweight loss to the 
funding council.
15 This situation is illustrated in Figure 4. Of all the models considered in the 





                                                 
14 Clearly if an alternative modelling strategy were adopted in which the zero-surplus constraint were not 
imposed,  richer insights could emerge from the modelling of funding formulae in the presence of tuition fees. 
But such an approach would not in our view satisfactorily capture the objectives of the funding council as they 
presently exist. 
15 Since institutions of higher education are not-for-profit organisations, the surplus may be absorbed in the form 
of a transfer to research activities. 
  92.5 Differential funding according to full economic costs 
 
In this section we show how the model would operate if the funding council remunerated 
different institutions at different levels in line with cost differentials across the institutions. 
Following Tinbergen (1952) it is clearly the case that the effective targeting of multiple 
objectives (such as the efficient determination of output in multiple institutions) requires a 
multiplicity of controls. Again in this case, strategic interdependence is not a feature of the 
model. Assume that each institution is remunerated so that it exactly covers its costs when it 
maximises its surplus, and – as in all previous models – the funding rule is such that zero 
output would entail zero remuneration. Then 
 
ic + c0qi + c1qi
2 + ε = c0qi + 2c1qi




qi =   √[(ic+ε)/c1] 
 
This solution is illustrated in Figure 5. Note that this implies that higher cost institutions have 
higher output than lower cost institutions, and that the marginal cost is higher in the former 
than in the latter. This represents an allocative inefficiency, since global costs could be 
reduced by transferring activity from the higher cost to the lower cost institution. In the next 
section we consider how a funding method might be designed that finesses this problem. 
 
 
2.6 A more flexible funding mechanism 
 
Consider the case where costs are given by  
 
Ci = ic + c0qi + c1qi
2 + ε 
 
where 2c < 1c. For the higher cost institution, set marginal cost equal to marginal revenue in 
such a manner that total revenue passes through the origin. Hence 
 
1c + c0q1 + c1q1






q1 =   √[(1c+ε)/c1] 
 
as before. But for institution 2, shift the total revenue function down so that it has an intercept 
below zero and is tangent to institution 2’s total cost curve at level of output q1. This implies 
that for institution 1 the revenue function is  {c0+2(1c+ε)/√[(1c+ε)/c1]}q1, but for institution 2 
it is 1c-2c+{c0+2(1c+ε)/√[(1c+ε)/c1]}q2.  
 
This solution is illustrated in Figure 6. Since marginal costs are now equal across institutions, 
this is an efficient solution. The formula adopted by the funding council in this case is one in 
which the per student award is constant across institutions, but a new component of the 
formula, related to fixed costs, is allowed to vary. This provides an efficient solution because 
the cost technology is also one in which fixed, but not variable, costs differ across institutions. 
 
  10This would appear to be a fairly realistic scenario. The present funding model is one which 
has the flexibility to accommodate variation in fixed costs (owing to location in London) but 
not variable costs. There may of course be reasons other than location why fixed costs differ: 
for example some institutions have historic buildings to maintain; others have collections to 
insure. It would be a matter for the funding council to decide which of these differences in 




2.7 Demand side considerations 
 
Hitherto, the level of output has been determined entirely by supply side considerations. In 
this section we consider the type of funding mechanism that might be introduced if the 
funding council sets (or has set for it by government) a target level, q*, for global output. 
Given the vertically parallel nature of the institutions’ cost functions, the optimal distribution 
of students across the two institutions is such that qi=q*/2  ∀i. Following the method 
established earlier, we determine for each institution the equation for the total revenue curve 
that is tangential to the institution-specific total cost curve at output level qi. In this case the 
total revenue curve is not constrained to pass through the origin for either institution.   
 
Hence if  
 
Ci = ic + c0qi + c1qi
2 + ε 
 
the slope of the revenue function is given by c0+c1q* and the intercept is ic+ε-c1q*
2/4. Hence 
funding from the funding council varies across institutions producing the same output, 
depending on the level of fixed costs, ic. This allows the funding council to compensate 
institutions that face high costs owing to, say, location, while ensuring that the marginal cost 
of delivering output is constant across institutions so that allocative efficiency is realised.  The 
solution is illustrated in Figure 7.  
 
 
2.8 Multiproduct institutions 
 
The above method can be generalised routinely to the case in which institutions produce 
multiple outputs (for instance, a multiplicity of subjects, qualifications at various levels, or 
study through a variety of modes of delivery) where the costs associated with each output 
may be distinct. It is appropriate to model such a scenario using a multiproduct cost function 
along the lines of those discussed by Baumol et al. (1982). Here we use a quadratic cost 






where q1i represents institution i’s output of type 1 and q2i represents its output of type 2. 
Suppose that global targets are set for the production of both output types at q1* and q2*, and 
note that here again the need to ensure the constancy of product-specific marginal costs across 
institutions so that allocative efficiency obtains requires each institution to produce q1*/2 and 
q2*/2 . 
 
  11The funding council can ensure that this solution will obtain by setting the revenue function 
facing each institution such that the marginal revenue due to output a in each institution is 




where a=1,2 and b≠a, and where f0 and f1 denote respectively c0 and c1 if a=1 and d0 and d1 if 






so that each institution earns zero surplus. The introduction of multiple outputs therefore 
raises no new issues of principle in the model, but it should be noted that for e≠0 the 
interaction of outputs has an impact on the intercept. 
 
 
3. Discussion and conclusions 
 
Two important issues stand out from the above analysis. First, how can the funding model of 
HEFCE be reconciled with the new policy of differential tuition fees? Note was made earlier 
of the fact that HEFCE funding policies tend to blunt the disciplinary effects of market forces. 
The introduction of these market forces might detrimentally affect some institutions for 
reasons beyond the institutions’ control – for instance some institutions may have higher fixed 
costs than others because their location or capital stock is in some way idiosyncratic. In such 
cases, financial difficulties may not be the result of managerial inefficiency, and it would be 
reasonable to expect HEFCE to provide additional financial support. But where an institution 
is in financial difficulty because of, say, mismanagement (perhaps because it has misjudged 
its market position and set tuition fees at an inappropriate level), it is not at all clear that 
HEFCE should simply fund the shortfall. In such cases, a change in the management of the 
institution, possibly through merger or takeover, might be a more appropriate solution. Key to 
HEFCE deciding on what to do in these circumstances is the availability of analysis that can 
distinguish between genuine cost differences between institutions on the one hand, and 
differences in institutional efficiency on the other.  
 
This relates to the second issue: if institutions are to be rewarded differentially according to 
their costs, how can the institution-specific costs be evaluated that drive the funding model be 
evaluated? More specifically, how can institutions be deterred from misreporting their costs in 
an attempt to earn surpluses? Clearly this too is a measurement issue, where the distinction 
between true cost differentials and inefficiency needs to be made clear.  
 
One possible solution lies in the estimation of statistical cost functions. The earliest modern 
attempt to evaluate such a function for universities is that of Cohn et al. (1989), though this 
was quickly followed by contributions by de Groot et al. (1991), Koshal and Koshal (1995), 
Glass et al. (1995), Johnes (1997) and others. More recent contributions have emphasised the 
nature of the cost curve as an envelope of efficient points in cost-output space, using 
stochastic frontier analysis to identify the true cost function and distinguish it from the effects 
of inefficiency (Johnes, 1996, 1998; Izadi et al., 2002; Stevens, 2005).
16 Still more recently – 
                                                 
16 It could be argued that the earlier studies estimated an expenditure function rather than a cost function. The 
use of frontier methods fixes this problem. 
  12and crucially in the context of the present discussion – studies have employed panel data to 
estimate random effect or random parameter frontier models (Johnes et al., 2005; Johnes and 
Johnes, 2005). These models have the considerable merit that they can be used to separate out 
genuine differences in fixed costs (and, in the random parameter case, also differences in 
variable costs) from differences in efficiency across higher education institutions. The 
econometric methods used to estimate the more sophisticated of these models are in their 
infancy, but the results of early analyses show great promise as a means of separating cost 
differentials from efficiency differentials. 
 
The state of higher education in the UK remains one of flux. The multijurisdictionality 
introduced by devolved government to Wales and, particularly, Scotland in 1998 has led to 
differences in the ways that students are funded across parts of the United Kingdom, and the 
sustainability of these inter-regional variations in the face of a sharp hike in the average level 
of tuition fees in England and Wales remains to be seen. Likewise, it is far from clear that the 
existing resource allocation models used by funding councils are sustainable in a world of 
(relatively) high and differential tuition fees. There are clear tensions between the objectives 
of central government and those of the national assemblies, on the one hand, and the funding 
councils on the other. In the case of the national assemblies, of course, devolution has been 
designed to produce regional policies that are suitable for the people of the region. In the case 
of the funding council, no such considerations are present. It seems that the tensions between 
funding council policy and the policies of central government are due to a failure of the 
principal-agent relationship between the two. These tensions will need to be resolved. 
 
The passage through parliament of the 2004 Higher Education Act which introduced 
differential fees was exciting. The Prime Minister had staked his future on the safe passage of 
the bill, yet one vote in the House of Commons was won by a margin of only 5 votes (even 
though the ruling Labour party had a majority in excess of 160 seats). The adjustments that 
need to be made by the assemblies and the funding councile alike will serve to ensure that the 
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Figure 2 Effect of a cut in average revenue on output 
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Figure 4 Deadweight associated with formula funding 



























Figure 5 Cost based funding with zero intercept 






























Figure 6 Cost based funding with flexible intercept 
 




































Figure 7 Cost based  funding with flexible intercept: the case of fixed output 
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